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Chasing after Huntington’s third wave 
of democratization 
 
The Middle East under change 
 
Reem Awny Abuzaid 
 





Escaping Huntington’s three waves of democracy, the Middle East has become a phenomenon. 
Ever since, the Middle East scholars attempted extensively to rationalize the prevailing 
authoritarian regimes over the past four decades; a number of theories were proposed to 
address such a paradox. Studying authoritarianism has denied the Middle East academic society 
the chance to predict the current wave of political change that is being witnessed in the region. 
A draw back that could be believed to have left researchers with limited theoretical 
explanations for the on going experience, but that could always remain superficial. in fact a 
number of theories on authoritarianism still carry an explanatory power, though remain 
sometimes insensitive to the differences between experiences, for theorizing the wave of 
political change in the region1. Principles such as authoritarian coercive apparatus, the lack of 
associational life, the weak institutional structure, and the non-existence of civil liberties, 
represents a dichotomy that in a way can help understanding the endurance of 
authoritarianism over the past four decades, while on another note still can rationalize the 
reasons that provoked the Arab uprisings. This paper searches for variables that could validate 




1 Middle East scholars (Anderson, 1987), (Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002), (Anderson, 2001), (Albersht and 
Schlumberger, 2004) have given great interest in understanding the role of regime type in enduring 
authoritarianism. Though it’s considered a valid explanation, yet was excluded from my paper. Taking into 
consideration that most of the effective uprisings that the region has witnessed is taking place in republics, hence 
my paper deliberately excludes the Arab monarchies from its data sample. 
 
State's Institutional structure: 
Due to various inherited values of Tribalism and Sectarianism, democratization efforts were 
hindered through weak institutional context. Lisa Anderson proposed that value system was 
vital in reshaping the institutional structure of the post-colonial era in the region. During early 
stages of state formation, states of the Middle East adopted a clearly centralized institutional 
structure that has put the regime elites in control of the policy making apparatus; hence, the 
state became more likely an instrument dominated by regime elites, and affected the social 
conflict balance.2  
Jason Brownlee also rested the lack of democratic change in the region to the weakness of 
institutional structure.3 In his article “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies”, Brownlee 
addresses one of the focal issues behind popular discontent in the region. In Egypt for instance 
succession was one of the main focal point of contentious that provoked mass discontent with 
the regime; while in Tunisia succession took a completely different form, with having what we 
call a Hereditary network of power among Ben Ali’s family members whom controlled the 
political and economic life in the country. As an extreme examples comes countries like Libya 
and Syria, which have witnessed more violent unrest as a reaction to a different level of 
 
2 Anderson, Lisa; ” the State in the Middle East and North Africa”, Comparative Politics, 20:1, 1987, (1- 18). 
3 Brownlee’s thesis emphasizes that authoritarian countries with weak institutionalized party system could 
engineer a ruling party that serves his authority and purpose in succession; on the other contrary, already 
established and institutionalized political party when predates the inauguration of the ruler would decrease the 
probability of succession.  
 
succession; in Libya, Gaddafi’s sons have control over all state activities, rather than 
institutions; while in Syria succession has taken place a long time ago. The relationship between 
hereditary succession and social unrest seems to explain why some regimes are struggling with 
uprisings, while in other countries like Lebanon or Algeria demands were only limited to some 
effective political changes.4 
It’s evidently proven that a weak institutional structure has allowed the regime elite to extend 
their power to all state institution, mainly through the ruling party. Using institutions as an 
instrument for the regime to enforce its interest, has allowed the ruler to choose his successor. 
Commonly, rulers of authoritarian regime name and groom their successors.5 State institutions, 
political parties in specific, though evolutionary developed into multi-party system, yet state 
parties were utilized as mechanisms to regain elite consensus; hence, put the whole 
institutional system under elites’ domination. 6Such a phenomenon of hybrid regimes, that 
swiped the Middle East as a response to foreign pressures for democratization, has helped 





4 Brownlee, Jason; “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies”, world politics, 59: 4, 2007, (595- 628). 
5 Kausch,Kristina; “Managed Successions and Stability in the Arab World,” Fundación para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) 2010, Madrid, Spain. 
6 King, Stephen J. ;“Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa”, political science quarterly, 
122:3, 2007. 
7 Brownlee, Jason; “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions”, American Journal 
of Political Science, 53:3, 2009, (515 – 532). 
 
Country Institutional structure and institutionalization of political liberalization 
Principle 
Variable Function of 
government 
















Egypt 3.21 4.3 2.0 3.1 
Tunisia 2.86 3.5 2.0 4.3 
Libya 2.14 3.0 1.0 2.2 
Syria 2.50 1.5 1.0 2.5 
Lebanon 3.93 5.5 6.0 2.5 
Algeria 2.21 4.3 2.0 2.9 
Table (1): level of institutionalism (score of 10 represents the highest score and 0 represents the lowest) 
Variables such as function of government, rule of law, and corruption show that Arab countries 
share a seriously low level of institutionalism. Only index on stability of democratic institutions 
could provide us a better vision, especially in case of Syria and Libya; with the lowest average of 
stability it shows that both represents the top candidates for suffering with a deteriorating 
conditions of institutionalism, especially when relates to political participation institutions such 
as political parties.12 The almost absence of political institutions in both countries represents a 
better opportunity for oppression and freedoms’ suppression; as well as represents a higher 
possibility of violence breaking down than in any other Arab country. 
 
 
8 The Economist Intelligence U nit,EIU’s index of democracy 2010, 
http://www.eiu.com/public/democracyindex.aspx , access date: May 18th, 2011.  
9 The Bertlesman Transformation Index 2008, http://bti2008.bertlesman-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf , 
access date: May 18th, 2011. 
10 The Bertlesman Transformation Index 2008, Ibid. 
11 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 results, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/CPi/2010 , access date: May 18th, 2011. 
12 Anderson, Lisa; Demysifying the Arab Revolt: Understanding the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya”, 
Foreign Affairs, 90:3, 2011, (1- 6). 
 
Coercive apparatus: 
Coercion is historically proven to be associated with authoritarianism in the Middle East. In her 
attempt to understand the lack of democratic change in the region, Eva Bellin assumes that 
power maintenance of the coercive power is a critical point in understand the endurance of 
authoritarianism.13 With the regime elites’ monopoly over coercive apparatus, the society 
would fall into the prerequisite condition for authoritarianism; controlling it would provide both 
conditions of strength and well for repression to be enforced on a given society.14 
Rejecting the Exceptionalism theory, as well as Huntington’s theory on democratization; 
concepts of Cultural Values, Islam, and Rent could no longer explain the continuation of 
authoritarian leaders in power (Andeson, 2001).15 Bellin, on the contrary, proposes that the 
focal reason behind the maintenance of authoritarian power is coercion; hence, coercive 
apparatus in the Middle East acts repressively to drive authoritarianism to robustness. Coercion 
is considered to be the only explanation for prevailing authoritarianism in countries of 




13 Marsha Posusney in her article on Enduring Authoritarianism proposes Bellin’s theory on the role of coercion in 
enduring authoritarian robustness as a complementary for the socio-economic prerequisites for democratization 
theory. Posusney emphasizes that in order to understand such a complex fact as authoritarianism in Middle East, 
analysis of cultural, economic, and coercive condition would be sufficient for such a purpose. 
14 Bellin, Eva; “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, 
Comparative Politics, 36: 2, 2004 (139- 157). 
15 Anderson, Lisa; ” Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects”, World Policy Journal, 18:3, 2001, p. 53- 54. 
 
Country Coercive apparatus 
Principle 
Variable Military expenditure (2010/ $ million) 







table (2): Government annual Spending on Military (2010) 
A strong coercive apparatus seems to be a precondition for a dictator to maintain his power; 
that is why authoritarian regimes of the Middle East spend millions of dollars to fund their 
coercive mechanism of containing the masses. Spending millions annually on military, while 
vital sectors such as Health Care, Unemployment fund, and Education suffer with limited 
budgets could be one of the reasons that fostered unrest in the region. Table (2) shows that 
military budget varies from a country to another, which dramatically varies. It’s important here 
to note that military in Arab countries take a relatively large sum of the annual budget in 
comparison to any other sector; though numbers included might be misleading, yet relating 
those numbers to the annual total expenditure as well with the population size it would prove 
that Arab countries alike tend to spend a large sum of the national budget on security and 
coercion. The Libyan military appears to be a different story with close disclosure on State 
 
16 Stockholm International Peace Institute, Military Expenditure Database (2010), hhtp://milexdata.sipi.org, access 
data: May 18th, 2011. 
17 There was no information on the Libyan Military available on the data base. 
Military’s capacity and expenditure, as it intersects with the fragmented tribal nature of armed 
organization in the country.18  
Elections and electoral systems: 
Election is one of the fundamental strategies that authoritarian regimes have adopted for a 
long time in order to preserve their power; which has successfully managed to hinder all the 
opportunities of establishing a legislative foundation for democratic change. Sociologically 
analysis of the regional conditions, Ellen Lust proposed that authoritarian regimes that hold 
elections are more likely to maintain their power in comparison to other regimes that don’t.  
Election as it is considered to be the main mean of democratic transition is preserved to be a 
strategy for enduring authoritarianism in the Middle East.19  In order for Regime elites and its 
supporters to maintain their authority and to maintain social penetration, they tend to engage 
the society in a vicious cycle of clientalism in which elections becomes only a competition 
between elites and opposition over scarce resources, either political or economic.20  
Using another institutional perspective, Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Jamal assumes that the 
regime type affects heavily the engineering of electoral system. It’s by no coincidence that 
dictators tend to adopt an authoritarian electoral system that hinders the opposition 
participation. Both scholars draw a generalization that an electoral system is a result of power 
 
18Hatita, Abdel Sattar; “Libya, Searching for a political map”, Arab Reform Brief, Arab Reform Initiative, issue no. 
48, April 2011. 
19 Posusney, Marsha P.; “Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Opposition 
Strategies”, Comparative International Development, 36:4, 2002, (34- 62). 
20 Lust, Ellen;  “Democratization by Elections? Competitive Clientalism in the Middle East”, Journal of Democracy, 
20: 3, 2009, (122-135). 
conflict between the regime elites and opposition, in which the regime elites are always 
powerful.2122  
    
Country Elections and electoral system 
Principle 
Variable Elections process and pluralism 







Table (3): pluralism index in the Arab world (10 represents the highest pluralist societies) 
Table (3) shows that Lebanon comes on the top of pluralist countries in the region, followed by 
Algeria; which represents a potential explanation for understanding why both countries’ 
regimes maintained their power, while regimes of Egypt and Tunisia were over thrown. Zero 
pluralism in Libya and Syria indicates a closely tight repression for political act; with them 
placed at the bottom with no plural elections at all provides a clearer image of the violent stand 




21 Lust-Okar, Ellen and  Jamal,Amany A.; “Rulers and Ruled: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral 
Law Formation,” Comparative Political Studies, 35: 3, 2002 (337-366). 
22 The theory carries explanatory power, yet it couldn’t be generalized to the whole spectrum of regime type in 
Middle East; hence, it remains to only explain the One-Party regimes along with the authoritarian Monarchies of 
the region. 
 
23 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ibid. 
 
Political participation and associational life: 
Authoritarian regimes have its impact on the type of participation (Posusney, 2004). Holger 
Albrecht proposed that in an authoritarian environment, individual participation and 
engagement in politics is minimal and ineffective in terms of participation quality.24 Political 
Parties in the Middle East suffer extensively not only with the authoritarian framework that 
they perform within, but also with the protracted internal conflict between the moderate and 
the radical approaches of thought (Clark and Schwelder, 2003); such a struggle has backed 
down their effort for democratization.25 The repressive political atmosphere has allowed the 
ruling elite to control the conditions of the opposition groups; therefore with the presence of a 
fragmented and divided opposition, the authoritarian regime managed to be maintain its 
power.26 Hence, political participation took a more flexible and integrative path and created a 
new paradigm of informal activism in which social society agencies became the only strategy of 
fighting repression of participation.27  Civil society agencies remain to be an effective apparatus 
for introducing a number of changes on some specific fields of great suffer, such as women’s 
 
24 in his article “ the nature of political participation”,  Holger Albercht focuses on judging participation in the light 
of an authoritarian regime; admitting that participation do exist in each and every regime type on the spectrum of 
political regimes, yet there is an important variables that might varies between an authoritarian and a liberal 
regime. Quality of participation is one of the variables that could test individuals’ involvement in politics; hence, 
the quality of participation in an authoritarian state would remain very low and insignificant in comparison to more 
integrative liberal ones. Reactive activism is the second variable, which is mainly used to test the level of co-
optation in a given regime; in authoritarian regimes, political activism is only a reaction to state policies and 
restrained by the regime elites’ rule of political game.  
25 Clark, Janine A. and Schwelder, Jillian; “who opened the window? Women’s activism in Islamist Parties”, 
Comparative Politics, 35: 3, 2003, (293 -312). 
26 Lust –Okar, Ellen; “Divided they Rule: the Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition”, Comparative 
Politics, 36: 2, 2004, (159 – 179). 
27 Albrecht, Holger; “ The Nature of Political Participation,” in Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni, editors, Political 
Participation in the Middle East (Lynne Reinner 2008). 
rights or labor’s economic rights, but remain not sufficient in fighting authoritarianism 
(Langohr, 2004). NGO’s activity is considered vital for democratization but still limited with a 
narrow purpose in comparison to political parties, especially when it comes to fighting for 
democratization.28  
The centralized control of authoritarian elite over the society has hindered mobilization efforts 
by the newly formed opposition groups throughout the past decades. Though the Middle East 
has witnessed, during the first decade of the twenty first century, an expansion in the 
formation of informal channels of expression and movements of protest, yet it remained 
ineffective and lacked participation (El-Mahdi, 2009).The complete domination of associational 
life denied opposition any political opportunity for collective action, but still allowed the 
formation of a genuinely new network of informal activism that carries the potential for 
collective mobilization.29 
Political participation became one of the most important principles under study in the region, 
as scholars realized that political change is a direct outcome of domestic demands.  Michael 
Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle specifically remarked the importance of socially inclusive, 
Cross-Class popular protesting as a precondition for change.3031 History has proven, and also 
the witnessed uprisings, that dictators don’t lean to voluntary stepping down their power, 
 
28 Langohr, Vickie; “ Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes”, Comparative 
Politics, (36:2), 2004, (181 – 204). 
 
29 El-Mahdi, Rabab; “Enough! Egypt’s Quest for Democracy”, Comparative Political Studies, Feb. 2009. 
30 By inclusive popular protesting, Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle meant a popular demand in which 
most of the society’s sectors participate; hence, highlighted the importance of political participation. 
31 Bratton, Michael; “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa”, Comparative Politics, 24:4, 1992, (419-442). 
instead tend to adopt a number of reforms in order to maintain legitimacy, but an organized 
popular opposition movement would be sufficient for pushing reforms further forward. 
Bratton and Van de Walle highlighted the importance of elites’ role in understanding the 
mechanisms of accepting or excluding opposition from the political game.32 The elite reactions 
towards social and political demands constitute the only prerequisite for adopting effective 
competitive multi-party elections, or otherwise it would have remained a façade of regime 
strategy for power maintenance. 33 
Stepping down the ruling regimes in Tunisia and then in Egypt, as well as challenging the 
remaining regimes of the region,34 was enforced by a newly created central powers of popular 
demand on contention with the ruling elites’ interest.35  The new central powers were craving 
for being heard out, hence political participation boomed in countries that has knew a long 
history of repression such as Egypt; the mass participation in the March 19th Referendum on 
the constitutional amendment was an obvious representation that after years of suppression 
populations of the region are craving for politically express their citizenship’s right of 
participation.36 
 
32 During the 1990s, African elites were enforced by external powers to adopt multi-party elections; according to 
Bratton and Van de Walle the outcome varied as a result of placing different elite reactions towards 
institutionalization of political parties. Hence, in countries with flexible elite the participatory democracy was more 
effective in comparison to rigid ones. 
 
33Bratton, Michael and Van de Walle, Nicolas; “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, World 
Politics, 46:4, 1994, (453- 489). 
34 Snyder has defined Neopatrimonial ruler to be a centralized executive of overwhelming power and penetrating 
ability over the society, who controls the state institutions with a close network of patronage elites; hence, he 
acquire legitimacy based on personal relations rather than ideology or law. Such a definition could precisely 
demonstrate the ruling regimes of the Middle East. 
35 Snyder,Richard; “Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships”, Comparative Politics, 24:4, 1992, (379- 399). 
36 Stacher, Joushua; “ Egypt Without Mubarak”, Middle East Reaserch and Information Project, April 7th, 2011. 
 
 




Political culture Political rights Social unrest 
(threats posed to 
governments by 
social protest)  
Source The Economist 
intelligence unit (2010)37 
The Economist 
intelligence unit (2010)38 
Freedom house ratings 
(2010)39 
The Economist 
intelligence Unit (2009/ 
10)40 
Egypt 2.78 5.0 Low (6) Low (5.4) 
Tunisia  2.22 5.63 Low (7) Low (4.6) 
Libya 1.11 5.0 Low (7) Low (4.3) 
Syria 1.67 5.63 Low (7) Moderate (5.8) 
Lebanon 6.67 5.0 Medium (5) High (7.0) 
Algeria 2.78 5.63 Low (6) High (6.6) 
Table (4): political participation, political culture, and associational life (10 represents the highest level of political participation and culture)  
Among variables testing associational life, countries of the Arab region seem to share a low 
level of political rights and a moderate average of political culture; yet an average that doesn’t 
meet the low level of political participation. Table (4) shows a minimal participation in Tunisia 
and Egypt, while both of Syria and Libya were placed at the bottom with almost no 
participation. With banning any formal channels of participation protest against repression 
seems to be the only way out; with such conditions violence appears to be a potential strategy 
to be adopted by both the ruling regime as well as the opposition. 
 
 
37 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ibid. 
38 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ibid. 
 
39 The Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2010: Global Data, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_TablesandGraphs.pdf , access date: May 18th ,2011. 
40 The Economist Intellignce Unit, Ibid. 
 
Civil Society, and the condition of Human Rights: 
Not only by reputation but reality proves that the Human Rights condition in the region took 
into deteriorating with the tight control of authoritarianism on the social and political life; such 
a fact denies the usual Arab eagerness to join each new international humanitarian agreement. 
Still the extreme oppressive environment that the Middle Eastern regimes have created 
remains an obstacle facing the ratification or even the implementation of such agreements 
under obligation.41  
Focusing on the individual level of analysis, Sheila Carapico proposes that Civil Society is a living 
organism which is deeply affected by not only the political and economic conditions, but also 
the state-civil society relationship; when the role of the civil society, with its potential for 
democratic change, encounters the role of the state as well as its absolute domination over the 
society its perceived as a zero-sum game. The prevailing strategy is the complete centralization 
of the civil society under the control of the ruling parties and the governmental agencies, which 
enforced opposition to adopt more of an informal pattern of activism.42 Adding to that the 
donor organizations tight agenda in regard of democratization in the region that have limited 
the civil society activities in the region to peripheral problems such as Gender Equality (Tadros, 
2010); problems that don’t demonstrate the region’s real suffer.43 
 
41 Allain, Jean and O’Shea, Andreas; “African disunity:  Comparing Human Rights Law and Practices of North and 
South African States”, Human Rights Quarterly, 24:1, 2002, (86 -125). 
42 Sheila Carapico, civil society and civic activism 
43 Tadros, Mariz; “Between the Elusive and the Illusionary: Donors’ Empowerment Agendas in the Middle East in 
Perspective”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East; 30: 2, 2010, (224 – 237). 
 
Country Civil society and Human Rights conditions 
Principle  
Variable Civil Liberty 





Lebanon  5.59 
Algeria  4.41 
table (5): civil liberty in the Arab world (10 represent the highest level of civil liberty) 
with the exception of Lebanon; Table (5) proves that countries of the region still share a low 
level of Civil Liberty, which reflects the deteriorating condition of associational life and the 
presence of a minimal if not an ineffective civil society. Egypt and Tunisia appear to resemble in 
condition, while Algeria comes to guarantee a wider margin of civil liberty; at the same instance 
that Libya and Syria remain at the bottom, denying their citizens almost any civil right. Hence, 
Civil Liberty could be one of the preconditions for social unrest and change demand; meaning 
that in the light of dramatically deteriorating civil liberty, violence might erupt as in the case of 
Libya and Syria. 
Concluding remarks: 
As much were the Uprisings taking place in the Middle East unprecedented, as it was 
academically impossible to be anticipated. After decades of attempting to rationalize the 
prevailing authoritarianism, scholars have proposed numerous theories to understand it; 
currently after the unexpected turn of events, it became researchers’ main concern to test the 
validity of these theories. 
 
 
44 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ibid. 
 
 Some of the proposed variables as much as it proved the validity of their principles, yet 
remained insensitive to the differences between each change experience. Remains the usage of 
variables such as Political Participation, stability of democratic institutions, Civil liberty, 
Pluralism, along with other variables have proved that theories on authoritarianism implicitly 
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